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STACKELBERG INDEPENDENCE*
Toomas Hinnosaar†
The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg 
quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the 
standard assumptions, leaders’ actions are informative about market 
conditions and independent of leaders’ beliefs about the arrivals of 
followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on 
all standard assumptions’ being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the 
demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are 
differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I 
show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may 
make the leaders’ choices completely uninformative.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can one deTermine markeT cHaracTerisTics and get early welfare esti-
mates in markets with sequential capacity investments? Do these markets re-
quire policy interventions? What will the long-term outcomes look like? In 
many markets, firms enter and build capacities sequentially. For example, 
energy markets have been liberalized in the last 25 years in many countries.1 
After such liberation, there is typically a single energy provider, but over time 
new entrants enter. A natural model to study such markets is the Stackelberg 
quantity leadership model, where firms choose their quantities (capacities) 
while observing the moves of earlier entrants.
In this paper, I first show that under the standard assumptions of the 
Stackelberg model, the questions stated above are easy to answer. The stan-
dard assumptions are (1) linear demand, and (2) constant marginal costs, (3) 
identical firms producing a homogeneous product. Under these assumptions, 
there is a simple relationship between the competitive quantity and leaders’ 
choices. Without any further knowledge about the model parameters, an ob-
server (such as a regulator or an econometrician) can learn the competitive 
quantity as soon as the first entrant makes a choice. This inference does not 
1 For example, until the end of the 1990’s, electricity markets were largely monopolistic in most 
European Union countries. The European Commission adopted liberalization directives for 
electricity in 1996 and 1998, opening these markets for competition. See https://ec.europa.eu/
compe titio n/secto rs/energ y/overv iew_en.html for details.
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require the observer or even the firms to have correct beliefs about the future 
arrivals of entrants.
I show that this result is driven by Stackelberg independence. I define 
Stackelberg independence as a property of sequential games, where each 
leader behaves independently of the number of followers. To show the im-
portance of this property, I first prove a limit result. If  the number of fol-
lowers is going to be large, so that the total quantity will be very close to a 
perfectly competitive quantity, then the leaders’ actions are approximately 
proportional to competitive quantity. This connection holds both with linear 
and non-linear demand functions. The reason is simple: near the competitive 
quantity, any demand function can be closely approximated by a linear de-
mand function. The same connection between leaders’ choices and the com-
petitive quantity continues to hold with a finite number of followers if  and 
only if  the leaders’ choices are independent of the number of followers, i.e., 
under the Stackelberg independence property.
The main contribution of the paper is the second part, which provides 
cautionary results. It shows that all assumptions of the standard model are 
necessary for the results to hold. Moreover, I provide an example that shows 
that even small deviations from the standard model may make the leaders’ 
choices uninformative about market conditions. Therefore, one should be 
cautious with policy implications from the standard model.
The intuitive reason why the standard model is special is simple. Each poten-
tial entrant affects the incentives of the leader in two ways. First, an additional 
firm increases the total equilibrium quantity. This reduces the equilibrium price 
and, therefore, the marginal benefit of producing an additional unit. This effect 
pushes the quantities of all existing firms downwards. Indeed, in a simultaneous 
choice model (Cournot oligopoly), this is exactly what we see—each additional 
firm increases the total quantity, but reduces the individual quantities. Second, 
by increasing its quantity, the leader can discourage the follower from choosing 
a large quantity. This discouragement effect pushes leaders’ quantities upwards. 
It is the reason why leaders typically choose larger quantities than followers in 
the Stackelberg model. The Stackelberg independence property is satisfied in the 
knife-edge case where the two effects are exactly equal so that additional follow-
ers (or even changed beliefs about the followers) neither increase nor decrease 
leaders’ optimal quantities.
The standard model discussed in this paper has been extensively used in 
the literature. Daughety [1990] used a two-period model with some leaders 
and some followers to study the benefits of concentration. The model has 
been later used and extended by Anderson and Engers [1992]; Pal and Sarkar 
[2001]; Lafay [2010]; Julien et al. [2011, 2012]; and Ino and Matsumura [2012] 
to cover more than two periods and an arbitrary number of firms in each pe-
riod. In all those papers, the model has the Stackelberg independence prop-
erty. I extend this literature by showing two results. First, the implications 
continue to hold when allowing stochastic arrival processes and arbitrary 
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beliefs about the arrival process. Second, I show that the characterization 
result is driven by Stackelberg independence.
On the other hand, there is a large literature studying sequential games 
with non-quadratic payoffs, including Dixit [1987]; Robson [1990]; Linster 
[1993]; Glazer and Hassin [2000]; Morgan [2003]; and Hinnosaar [2018], 
whose characterization results do not exhibit the Stackelberg independence 
property.2 This means that not all Stackelberg leadership models have the 
Stackelberg independence property. In this paper, I show that this is not a 
coincidence—all the assumptions of the standard model are necessary for 
Stackelberg independence and the simple characterization obtained in the 
standard model.3
Methodologically, the paper builds on recent results from aggregative and 
sequential games. While the literature on oligopolies is very established, start-
ing from Cournot [1838] for oligopolies with simultaneous choices and von 
Stackelberg [1934] in leadership models, such games with non-linear demand 
functions have been difficult to handle. In recent years, the novel results on 
aggregative games4 have been successfully applied to shed new light on oli-
gopolies, for example, by Nocke and Schutz [2018]. In this paper, I build on 
the characterization results from sequential contests from Hinnosaar [2018].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II. studies the standard model. 
I first show by example with a single leader how the leader’s action is infor-
mative and independent of the number of followers. I then characterize the 
equilibria for the general case and discuss the properties of the equilibrium. 
Section III. shows how these results are driven by Stackelberg independence 
property. Section IV. shows how each of the assumptions in the standard 
model is necessary for the results. Section V. concludes. The proofs are in 
appendix A.
II. THE STANDARD MODEL
There are n firms producing a homogeneous good with constant marginal 




xi is the total quantity produced by all firms, xi ≥0 is the individ-
ual quantity of firm i, X— > 0 is the market saturation quantity, and aX— > c.
Firms are partitioned into T groups that I call periods. The set of firms 





 is a partition of n =
∑T
t= 1
nt firms. If  firm i∈t arrives 
2 For a literature review on Stackelberg games, see Julien [2018], and for sequential contests, 
see Konrad [2009].
3 Julien et al. [2012] show that the standard assumptions are both necessary and sufficient for 
a stronger property than the Stackelberg independence: taking into account the best-responses, 
leaders maximize the same problem as they would maximize without followers. They do not 
show that the standard assumptions are necessary for Stackelberg independence.
4 See Acemoglu and Jensen [2013] and Jensen [2018].
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before firm j∈s (i.e., t < s), then firm i is a leader for firm j and correspond-
ingly firm j is a follower for firm i. Firm i arriving in period t observes the 
cumulative quantity of its leaders, i.e., firms that arrived prior to period t. I 





xj. Firm i chooses xi 
simultaneously with other firms arriving in period t.
Let x∗
i
(n) denote the equilibrium quantity of firm i when the sequence of 




being independent on the sequence of followers nt = (nt+1, … , nT ). Formal 
definition is as follows.
Definition 1. (Stackelberg independence). The model satisfies 
Stackelberg independence property if  for all sequences n, all periods 
t, and all firms i∈t, for each n̂ = (n̂1, … , n̂T ) such that n̂s = ns for all  
s ≤ t, the equilibrium quantity x∗
i
 is the same with n̂ as with n. 
In particular, Stackelberg independence requires that each firm behave as 
if  there were no followers. For example, if  there is a single first-mover, then 
Stackelberg independence implies that the first-mover chooses monopoly 
quantity regardless of the actual sequence of followers. An alternative inter-
pretation of Stackelberg independence is that firms in each period t behave as 
Cournotian oligopolists on the residual demand left by firms in earlier 
periods.5
Note that the property does not put any restrictions on off-path behavior, 
nor does it prohibit the equilibrium behavior of firm i depending on the num-
ber of firms arriving either at the same period or earlier than firm i.
II(i). Example
Suppose that the inverse demand is linear P(X)  =  a(X—−X) and the mar-








. Suppose that firms arrive in 
two periods. In the first period, a single leader (called firm 1) arrives and 
chooses quantity x1. In the second period n−1 ≥ 0 followers arrive, observe 





Straightforward calculations show that in equilibrium the best-response 








. Firm 1 takes this into account 
and solves 
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Note that n enters the maximization problem multiplicatively. While n affects 
the leader’s profit, it does not affect the maximization problem. The leader’s 





 regardless of n.
The equilibrium quantities for various values of n are illustrated by 
Figure 1. As n increases, the total equilibrium quantity (marked with circles) 
rises to competitive quantity Xc, but the leader’s quantity (solid horizontal 





. This is an example of the Stackelberg in-
dependence property—the leader’s behavior is independent of the number of 
followers.
Just by observing the leader’s quantity x∗
1
, an observer can immediately 





. This does not require 
the observer to wait until the followers have made their choices. Moreover, 
the observer does not need to know either the number of followers or what 
the leader thinks the number of followers is. When the followers arrive and 
make their choices, the observer can determine how competitive the market 
is by comparing the total quantity X ∗ to the competitive quantity Xc. The 







 is the total equilibrium quantity.
II(ii). Equilibria
I now show that all the properties of the previous example generalize to any 
sequence n. Moreover, to formalize the fact that even the beliefs about the 
arrival process do not play any role in the equilibrium characterization, I 
allow a general arrival process and beliefs in this subsection. In particular, 
Figure 1 
Notes: Equilibria in Stackelberg model with one leader and n−1 followers under standard 
assumptions (linear demand, constant identical marginal costs)
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I assume that the sequence n is a random variable that may come from any 
distribution. The only restriction that I impose is that no firms arrive after 
some finite period T. This means that I can use notation n = (n1, … , nT ) and 
 = (1, … ,T ) to denote realizations of the random process, and find the 
equilibrium using backward induction.
Firm i∈t that arrives in period t observes the cumulative quantity Xt−1 
and the number of firms arriving in period nt. It may also get some public or 
private signals about the arrival process of followers. Using all this informa-
tion, firm i forms a belief  about the future arrival process nt = (nt+1, … , nT ). 
Note that these beliefs may be different for different firms in the same period 
and can depend on Xt−1 as well as on the individual quantities of the leaders.
Proposition 1. (Characterization Result for the Standard Model). The total 
equilibrium quantity X ∗ and individual quantities (x∗
1
, … , x∗
n
) are given by 
The proof in Appendix A generalizes the example in the previous section 
using mathematical induction. As in the example, the best-response function 
of the firms in the last period is linear. Therefore both the total quantity 
X ∗ and the net demand P(X ∗)−c induced by each XT−1 are linear functions 







. Therefore when firms in period T−1 form an expectation 
about the net demand, it depends on the number of followers, is multiplica-
tively separable from the maximization problem, and does not affect the opti-
mum. Standard mathematical induction shows that this is true for all players.
II(iii). Properties
As in the example, the general characterization in proposition 1 provides a 
clear connection between the actions of the leaders and the model param-
eters. Just by observing the choice x∗
i
 of  one player i in period t and the num-
ber of firms in each period up to period t, an observer can determine the 







(1+ns). By observing all quan-
tities, the observer can determine Xc−X
∗, i.e., distance from the competitive 
equilibrium quantity to the equilibrium quantity, which is proportional to 
the dead-weight loss. Note that these observations are independent on the 
arrival process and beliefs about the arrival process.
These properties of the standard model are a consequence of the 
















, ∀t∈{1, … , t}, ∀i∈t.
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is independent of the number of followers it has. Therefore it is natural that 
its choice does not depend either on the number of followers or the belief  
about their arrival process. In the next section, I show that this connection 
is even deeper. The characterization formulas in Proposition 1 hold more 
generally in the limit with an infinitely large number of followers. Therefore 
for the same results to hold for a finite number of players, the choices of the 
leaders must be the same with a finite and infinite number of players, i.e., 
under Stackelberg independence.
III. COMPETITIVE LIMITS AND STACKELBERG INDEPENDENCE
In this section, I relax the standard model by allowing demand to be non-
linear. In particular, let P(X) be any strictly decreasing and smooth demand 
function in [0,  X—], such that the first-order necessary conditions are also 
sufficient and there is a saturation point X— such that P(X) = 0 if  and only if  





 with P(Xc) = c.
III(i). Competitive Limits
The first result establishes leaders’ behavior in competitive limits, where 
the number of firms converges to infinity. The first part is intuitive—as the 
number of firms becomes large, the total equilibrium quantity converges to 
competitive quantity Xc. This has been shown earlier in various settings, for 
example by Robson [1990] and Hinnosaar [2018]. Note that this aggregate 
limit is the same regardless of the period in which period the number of firms 
converges to infinity.
The limiting behavior of individual firms depends on the period in which 
the number of firms is increased. Naturally, if  a firm arrives simultaneously 
with a large number of firms, they all produce negligible quantities. Similarly, 
each firm that follows an infinitely large number of leaders also produces a 
negligible quantity in the competitive limit.
The novel part of the proposition is the limit behavior of the finite number 
of leaders. The leaders’ quantities are uniquely determined by the competi-
tive equilibrium quantity Xc and the number of firms in each period up to 
the arrival of this particular leader. Comparing the limiting quantity of a 
leader in Proposition 2 to the one from the standard model in Proposition 1 
reveals that the leaders’ behavior is identical in both cases. This is natural, as 
the non-linear function could be closely approximated by a linear function 
near the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (Competitive Limits). Let Xc = P
−1(c) be the competitive 
equilibrium quantity with inverse demand P(X) and marginal cost c ≥ 0. Fix a 
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sequence n = (n1, … , nT ) and let us increase nt in a particular period t. Then 
the limiting total quantity limnt→∞ X
∗(n) = Xc and individual quantities for 
each firm i∈s are 
The proof is in Appendix A, but to illustrate the argument let me dis-
cuss the single leader case studied in Section II(i)., i.e., n  =  (1, n−1) with 
n→∞ here. The followers observe x1 and maximize xi (P(X )−c). Combining 
their optimality conditions gives an equation that defines total equilib-










. Adding up the conditions for all followers 
gives a condition 
which implicitly defines the aggregate best-response function of all followers. 
Inserting this into the maximization problem of the leader and taking the 
optimality conditions gives an equilibrium condition 
Clearly, as n→∞, the left-hand X ∗→Xc and g(X ∗)→g(Xc) = 0. Moreover, 





. Taking the limit from the leader’s equilibrium quantity 
defined by Equation (4) gives 
III(ii). Stackelberg Independence
The combination of the limit result with the Stackelberg independence prop-
erty gives a precise prediction for the equilibrium behavior of firms. Namely, 



















(5) X ∗ = ng (X ∗)− (n−1)g� (X ∗) g (X ∗) .
lim
n→∞
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By Stackelberg independence, their equilibrium behavior must be independ-
ent of the number of followers, so their equilibrium quantity must always be 
equal to the limit found in Proposition 2. This is stated as Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. (Competitive Limits and Stackelberg Independence). If  the 
model has the Stackelberg independence property, then for all s < T and all 
i∈s, 
Note that the behavior of the firms in the last period is not determined 
by Corollary 1, as they do not have any followers and therefore Stackelberg 
independence has no implications on their behavior. If  we extend the argu-
ment slightly, by allowing the possibility that they may also have followers 
and therefore their behavior is also characterized by equation (6), we can 
add up all equilibrium quantities and get a unique prediction for the total 
equilibrium quantity 
IV. NECESSARY CONDITIONS
In this section, I show that the assumptions of the standard model discussed 
above are necessary for the results. I relax the assumptions of the standard 
model one-by-one and show that the Stackelberg independence property 
fails.
IV(i). Linearity
The first main assumption of the standard model is that the demand func-
tion is linear. More precisely, the difference between demand and marginal 




. Relaxing this assumption, I assume 
that P(X) is a continuously differentiable (but possibly non-linear) function 
that satisfies the regularity conditions so that the equilibrium is interior and 
the second-order conditions for each firm are satisfied. The following result 
shows that if  the Stackelberg independence property holds at least for two-
period deterministic arrival processes n = (n1, n2) and for all constant mar-
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Proposition 3. (Linearity is Necessary). Suppose for all c ≥ 0, all 
n = (n1, n2) the model has the Stackelberg independence property. Then 




 for some a > 0,Xc > 0.
The proof is in Appendix A. Let me illustrate the key ideas of the proof. 
First, Proposition 2 gives a unique prediction of the leaders’ total equilib-





 for any n1≥1 and any c ≥ 0, where Xc = P
−1(c) is 
the competitive quantity. On the other hand, in n1-player Cournot oligopoly 
the equilibrium quantity is characterized by the condition X ∗ = n1g(X
∗,c), 
where g(X ,c) = −P(X )−c
P�(X )
. According to the Stackelberg independence as-
sumption, these two quantities must coincide, which gives a condition that 
relates n1,c and the demand function through g(X,c) function and Xc, 
The rest of the proof uses this condition to identify the shape of the de-
mand function P(X). It shows that at any point X ∈  (0, X—), its derivative 
P�(X ) = P�(0). As P is assumed to be continuously differentiable, it implies 
that P is indeed linear.
Mathematical Intuition. Let me also discuss the mathematical intuition of 
this result more formally. Hinnosaar [2018] provides a general characteriza-
tion for this type of sequential games with non-quadratic payoffs. The total 
equilibrium quantity X ∗ is defined by equation 
where S1(n), … ,ST (n) are integers that capture the informativeness of the 
game n = (n1, … , nT ) and g1, … , gT are defined recursively as 
The gk(X
∗) terms capture the higher-order strategic substitutability of quan-
tities. In particular, g1(X
∗) captures the fact that increasing the quantity 
slightly reduces the marginal benefit of firms’ own quantity. It is weighted 
by S1(n) = n, i.e., the number of firms. Next, g2(X
∗) captures the fact that an 
increase in the leader’s quantity reduces the marginal benefits for all its fol-
lowers, therefore discouraging them. This term is multiplied by S2(n), which 
counts the number of all leader-follower pairs in the model. The other terms 
capture the same idea, but at a higher order. For example, g3(X
∗) captures 
the fact if  firm i increases its quantity and firm j observes this and responds, 















g1(X ) = g(X ) = −
P(X )−c
P�(X )
, gk+1(X ) = −g
�
k
(X )g(X ), ∀k = 1, … ,T −1.
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indirect influences. Again, each such term gk(X
∗) is weighted by the total 
number of k-step paths in the model. Each additional follower typically adds 
influences on all levels.
The equilibrium quantity of firm i arriving in period t is 
where S1(n
t),… ,ST−t(n
t) capture the informativeness of the remainder game 
after the move of player i, i.e. nt = (nt+1, … , nT ), and g1, … , gT−t are defined 
as above, with the same interpretation.
Each additional follower increases the total quantity X ∗, which therefore 
reduces firm i’s incentive to increase quantity. This effect works by reducing 
gk(X
∗) terms, which are strictly decreasing in the case of higher-order strate-
gic substitutes. However, it also increases informativeness of nt, which means 
that firm i influences more firms. This increases x∗
i
 directly. Depending on 
the demand function, the comparison of these two opposite effects can go in 
either direction.
In the case of linear demand, these two effects are exactly equal. Namely, if  
P(X) = a(X—−X), then g(X ) = Xc−X , where Xc = X −
c
a
> 0, and therefore 
each gk(X ) = Xc−X . Combining these, we get that 
and 
which are the same expressions we derived above and are indeed independent 
of the number of followers nt = (nt+1, … , nT ). However, note that the fact 
that the terms involving nt canceled out in the expression relied on the fact that 
all the information measures Sk(n) had an equal weight gk(X
∗) = Xc−X
∗, 
which means that all direct and indirect substitutability effects were equal. 
This is not the case for non-linear demand functions or other deviations from 
the standard linear model, therefore there is no reason to expect these terms 
to vanish.
IV(ii). Example with a Non-Linear Function
The following example shows that even small deviations from the stand-
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Consider the same example as in Section II(i)., but with a small modifica-
tion in the demand function. Instead of a linear function, let the demand 
be P(X) = a(X—−X)−ɛ sin (kπX), where k∈ℕ, π ≈ 3.14159, and ɛ > 0 is suf-
ficiently small so that the regularity conditions are satisfied. By construction, 
the competitive quantity is still Xc and the new demand function differs from 
the original linear demand function at most by ɛ. Therefore by taking a small 
ɛ, we can closely approximate the original function. On the other hand, if  k 
is increased at the same time as ɛ is decreased, the derivatives of P are still far 
away from the derivative of the original function, i.e., −a.
The total equilibrium quantity X ∗ is given by Equation (5) and the leader’s 
quantity by Equation (4). To see how non-linearity changes the result, let 
us consider k = 4 and two values ɛ = ±0.023a. This means that we consider 
two small deviations from the linear demand curve that are still visible on 
figure 2a.
Figure 2a illustrates why the conclusions differ in the case of non-linear 
demand. First, if  n = 1, i.e., the leader is a monopolist, then near the origi-
nal monopoly quantity Xc
2
, the slopes of the two non-linear demand curves 
differ. When ɛ < 0 (the solid black line) the slope near Xc
2
 is steeper than −1, 
therefore the monopoly quantity is now lower than 0.5. On the other hand, 
when ɛ > 0 (the dashed dark-gray line) the curve is less steep than the original 
demand curve, which pushes the monopoly quantity towards the right. These 
three monopoly quantities are denoted by vertical lines in the middle of fig-
ure 2a. As we can see, relatively small differences in the demand curves lead 
to visible numerical differences in monopoly quantities.
Next, if  there is one follower (n = 2), then the total equilibrium quantity 
is closer to the competitive quantity Xc (the three vertical lines towards the 
right). Near the original equilibrium quantity 3
4
Xc, the ɛ < 0 case (the solid 
black line) has a less elastic demand and thus higher total equilibrium quan-
tity than the linear curve and ɛ > 0 case (the dashed dark-gray line) has a 
Figure 2 
Notes: Equilibria with demand functions P(X) = a(X
—
−X) ± 0.023a sin (4πX) and constant 
marginal costs in Stackelberg model with one leader and n−1 followers
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more elastic demand and therefore lower total quantity. The leader’s cor-
responding quantities for ɛ < 0 and for ɛ > 0 are now reversed in order and 
differ significantly.
Figure 2b shows the leader’s and the total equilibrium quantity as a func-
tion of the number of firms. It shows that the number of followers has a sig-
nificant impact on the equilibrium behavior of the leader, so we do not have 
Stackelberg independence here. Moreover, the leader’s equilibrium quantity 
is significantly higher or lower than Xc
2
 even in the case of the same demand 
function. This means that now we cannot conclude that much from the lead-
er’s quantity x∗
1
. Its connection with the competitive quantity Xc depends 
on the leader’s expectation about the number of followers and the particu-
lar shape of the demand function. Indeed, suppose that the observer knows 
that the demand function is one of the two non-linear curves indicated in 
Figure 2a, say with equal probabilities. Then for each X, the expected price 




, i.e., in expectation, the curve is linear, with an error 
term less than 0.005. The total equilibrium quantity behaves as one would 
expect, converging to competitive quantity. However, the leader’s quantity 
x∗
1
 depends largely on the particular demand function and also the expected 
number of followers.
Finally, Figure 3 describes the same calculations for ɛ  =  0.00025 and 
k = 100. As the figure illustrates, the demand curve is now virtually indis-
tinguishable from the linear curve (having nevertheless sizable derivatives). 
Vertical lines in Figure 3a show that the leader’s action when n is either 1, 2, 
or 3 differs significantly and Figure 3b shows that the same pattern continues 
for larger n and the convergence to Xc
2
 is slow as n→∞. Therefore the leader’s 
action can be uninformative and depends heavily on n even when the demand 
function is very close to linear.
Figure 3 
Notes: Equilibria with demand function P(X) = a(X
—
−X) − 0.00025a sin (100πX) and constant 
marginal costs in Stackelberg model with one leader and n−1 followers
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IV(iii). Identical Firms
The second main assumption of the standard model is that the firms are identi-
cal. In this section, I relax this assumption while keeping the other assumptions 
of the standard model unchanged. I assume that each firm i may have a different 
constant marginal cost ci ≥0 and a different linear inverse demand function 






. The latter captures the possibility that the firms may oper-
ate under different tax rules or have different incentive structures for the decision-
















 is the total quantity at which firm i would earn zero profit. 
Note that ai affects the payoff multiplicatively and therefore does not affect the 
equilibrium behavior. The only relevant parameter is, therefore, X
i
c




 are commonly known and for simplicity, I focus on the 




sufficiently small, so that in equilibrium all firms choose an interior solution to 
their maximization problem.6
For a formal statement, I use Stackelberg independence in a specific com-
parison. The statement requires that for arbitrary sequential oligopoly n 
(with linear payoffs as described above) adding one follower at the end does 
not change any of the equilibrium choices of previously existing firms. In 




= Xc is necessary for the equilibrium behavior to be unchanged.
Proposition 4. (Identical Firms are Necessary). Suppose that the equi-










) and these quantities remain the same when add-
ing a firm with parameter Xc on period T +1. Then X
i
c
= Xc for all firms.
The proof is in Appendix A. To illustrate the argument, let us compare 















. With two sequential 









Therefore the leader maximizes 
This problem is equivalent to the monopoly problem and gives the same solu-











, for example, because ci ≪ cj, then it is to be expected that there could be equilib-
ria where i wants to deter j’s entry by choosing a quantity that makes entry unprofitable. In this 
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IV(iv). No Other Quadratic Payoffs
The remaining assumptions of the standard model are about externalities 
and non-constant marginal costs. I address these issues by allowing the pay-
off function of each firm to be a symmetric but more general quadratic func-
tion in the following form7 
Let me first give a few comments about this class of functions. First, under 
the assumption that the equilibrium is interior (i.e., satisfying the first- 
order optimality conditions), the parameter 0 is irrelevant. Second, this for-
mulation allows quadratic costs, where the marginal cost is either linearly 
increasing or decreasing. Third, the formulation makes it possible to study 
oligopolies with differentiated products, where the inverse demand function 
of firm i is Pi(x) = a(X −xi)−b
∑
j≠i xj. When b = a, the products are ho-
mogeneous (i.e., perfect substitutes), if  b < a they are imperfect substitutes, 
and if  b < 0 they are complements. Finally, if  1≠0 then there are direct pay-
off  externalities. The following Proposition 5 shows that all these extensions 
would violate Stackelberg independence.
Proposition 5. (No Other Quadratic Payoffs). Suppose that the Stackelberg 
independence property is non-trivially satisfied for all n = (n1, n2) and the 
payoff of player i is given by Equation (7). Then 2 = 22 and 1 = 0, and 





Proof.  For a fixed X1, combining the first-order optimality conditions of 
all firms in period 2 gives the total quantity as a function of X1, which is 
Inserting this into the optimization problem of the leaders and solving for 
the equilibrium conditions gives their total equilibrium quantity 
Non-trivial Stackelberg independence requires that this expression is inde-
pendent on n2 for all n1, but is not always 0. The non-triviality requires that 
7 For a discussion about the use and foundations of quadratic games, see Lambert et al. [2018].
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1≠0 and 2≠2. Requirement that 1(2−22) = 0 implies therefore that 
2 = 22. Finally, 12 = 0 implies that either 1 = 0 or 2 = 0, but the pre-
vious two observations exclude the possibility that 2 = 0. Therefore indeed 
1 = 0 and 2 = 22. Inserting this into Equation (7) and noting that 0 does 




This paper studies the standard model of sequential capacity choices. 
Standard assumptions are often made for tractability and not necessarily 
because of empirical validity: firms are identical, demand is linear, mar-
ginal costs are constant, and there are no externalities. I show that in this 
standard model, leaders’ actions are informative about the markets due to 
the Stackelberg independence property. Just by observing a single entrant, 
an observer can deduce the competitive quantity, and it is easy to construct 
a good welfare measure just by observing the equilibrium quantity choices. 
Moreover, under the standard assumptions, these arguments are independent 
of the arrival process and even firms’ beliefs about the arrival process.
The second part of the paper bears negative results. Namely, it shows that 
all the assumptions of the standard model are necessary for the conclusions. 
Moreover, an example shows that even small deviations from standard as-
sumptions may lead to large changes in behavior, making the leaders’ choices 
uninformative about the market conditions. Therefore, one should be careful 
about making the standard assumptions just for tractability.
These results highlight the fact that the standard assumptions used in the 
literature cover only the knife-edge case where different incentives balance 
out. An additional follower increases the equilibrium quantity and therefore 
reduces the incentive to choose high quantities for all firms, whereas having 
more followers motivates leaders to raise their quantities to discourage fol-
lowers from raising theirs. These effects cancel each other out only when the 
demand is linear. Similarly, if  the follower has a higher or lower cost than 
the leader or if  the goods are non-homogeneous or there are externalities, 
then these effects do not cancel out even in the case of linear net demand 
functions.
I did not discuss a few other standard assumptions that can be relaxed and 
would also affect Stackelberg independence. I maintained the assumption 
that the equilibrium is interior, which requires that there are no fixed costs (or 
they are small) and firms do not differ much. However, if  the fixed costs are 
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and entry deterrence become strategic questions. Of course, this would make 
Stackelberg independence even less likely to hold.
Similarly, I assumed that there was common knowledge about firms’ pay-
offs and other model characteristics. In some applications, such as energy 
markets, this assumption may be realistic: although firms may not know ex-
actly which of the potential competitors will enter the market, they may have 
a good understanding of the technologies they would use. In other markets, 
it would be natural for firms to be unsure both about the potential entrants 
and their payoff function parameters. Relaxing this is also possible, and one 
implication would be that Stackelberg independence continues to hold with 
interim-identical firms, i.e., firms that may differ in realization, but at the 
moment of their decision, they expect followers to be similar to them.
APPENDIX 
PROOFS
I(i). Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.  Firm i in the last period T observes XT−1 and knows both nT and the fact 
that there are no followers. Therefore its maximization problem is 
where X ∗(XT−1) is the total quantity induced by XT−1 if  all firms in period T behave 
optimally. Combining all the optimality constraints gives us 
Now take firm i in period T−1. An important object in its maximization problem 
is P(X ∗(XT−1))−c, i.e., the per-unit realized profit, assuming that after its choice, 
the cumulative quantity is XT−1 and followers behave optimally. Note that since the 
number of followers is random, firm i takes expectation of this term according to its 
beliefs, i.e., 







, which is the same 










































© 2020 The Authors. The Journal of Industrial Economics published by Editorial Board and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
TOOMAS HINNOSAAR18
I prove the proposition by induction. Suppose that at period t, each player i expects that 













(note: we already verified this for t = T and t = T−1). Then i maximizes 






leads to the cumulative equilibrium quantity after period t induced by Xt−1, which I 
denote by X ∗
t
(Xt−1). 
Taking the expectation from the perspective of firm i∈t−1 indeed gives 
Using these results and the fact that cumulative quantity in the beginning of 






, therefore for each i∈1 the equi-







































I(ii). Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.  By Hinnosaar [2018], the total equilibrium quantity is characterized by 




gk+1(X ) = −g
�
k
(X )g(X ), and Sk(n) denotes the number of level-k observations
8 in 





































































8 S1(n) is the number of players, S2(n) is the number of players observing other players, etc.
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Hinnosaar [2018] also shows that limnt→∞ X
∗ = Xc. The following Lemma 1 shows 
that the limits gk(Xc) = 0 and g
�
k
(Xc) = −1 for all k.




Proof.  Clearly g1(Xc) = g(Xc) = −
P(Xc)−c
P�(Xc)
= 0 and 
Suppose that gk(Xc) = 0 and g
�
k
(Xc) = −1. Then 
 □
Define n−t = (n1, … , nt−1, nt+1, … , nT ), i.e., the sequence n with nt left out. 
Note that Sk(n) is the number level-k observations in n, which can be computed by 
first taking all level-k observations in the subsequence n−t and then adding the new 
observations involving nt, of  which there are nt times Sk−1(n−t).
9 Taking the limit 
nt→∞ from equation (9) then leads to 




(X ∗)g(X ∗), where limnt→∞ g
�
k−1
(X ∗) = −1.















































�(Xc) = 0− (−1)(−1) = −1.
9 For notational convenience, S0( ⋅ ) is always 1 and ST (n−t) = 0 as there cannot be any level-T 
observations.
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Proof.  Proof is again by induction.
If  T = 1, then 1+
∑1
k = 1
Sk(n) = 1+S1(n1) = 1+n1. Suppose the claim holds for 
T−1-period games. Then for T-period game n = (n1, … , nT ) 
As n−T is a T−1-period game, ST (n−T ) = 0 and the induction assumption gives us 
Also, S0(n−T ) = 1, so 





Using the representation from Lemma 2, we can rewrite 
Inserting this expression to Equation (11) gives 
Take firm i∈s in period s, whose equilibrium quantity is characterized by 
Equation (10). Taking the limit 
There are two cases. If  t≤s, then nt is not included in n
s, so each Sk(n
s) is a finite 
integer and therefore Sk(n
s)g(X ∗) converges to Sk(n




= 0. The second case is when t > s, which is the case when player i be-
longs to a finite set of leaders and is followed by an infinite number of followers. Then 

























Sk−1(n−T ) = 1+
T∑
k = 2





































































) using representation from Lemma 2 and inserting limit 
from Equation (12) gives 
 □
I(iii). Proof of Proposition 3
Let Xc = P
−1(c) denote the competitive quantity, so that P(Xc) = c.
Proof.  Consider the case when n2 = 0, i.e., there are n1≥1 firms who make a si-




. The equilibrium 
is defined the first-order conditions for all firms 
where for brevity I denote g(X ,c) = −P(X )−c
P�(X )
. Adding up the conditions for all firms 
gives 
By Stackelberg independence, the total quantity of the n1 leaders must be the same for 
any n2. From corollary 1, we get that the leaders’ total equilibrium quantity must be 





. This gives a condition for c≥0,n1∈ℕ, 
From this, we can determine some properties of g(X, c), which in turn identifies the 






. By taking c = P(2X) 
and n1 = 1, we can ensure that Xc = 2X  and therefore equation (15) takes the form 
Now, take any n1≥1 and some c
′. The total equilibrium quantity in n1-player 






P−1(c�). Note that this is a continuous 










































































= X = g(X ,c).
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0 when c�→∞. Therefore there exists c′ such that the equilibrium quantity is exactly 
n1
1+n1
Xc� = X . The equilibrium condition equation (14) is X = n1g(X ,c
�). Finally, 
note that by definition, 
Inserting this function and the values c = P(Xc) = P(2X ) and 






 to the equilibrium condition gives 
which is equivalent to 
Suppose that n1 = 2. Then applying Equation (17) 
2
3
X  gives 
Similarly, when n1 = 3, Applying equation (17) on 
3
4
X  gives 
Combining the previous two equations we get 
On the other hand, for a fixed X, the limit n1→∞ in Equation (17) gives 
g(X ,c) = −
P(X )−c
P�(X )
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Combining this with Equation (18), we get 
That is, for all X ≤ X
2
, we must have P�(X ) = P�(0), i.e., P(X ) = P(0)+P�(0)X . 
For all X
2
< X ≤X  we can apply Equation (18) at X
2
 and get 
Noting that 0 = P(X ) = P(0)+P�(0)X , so P(0) = −P�(0)X  and denoting 
a = −P�(0) > 0, we get that P(X) = a(X−X) for some a > 0 for all X ∈ [0, X]. □
I(iv). Proof of Proposition 4
Proof.  To compare the two sequential oligopolies in the proposition, i.e., 
the original T-period oligopoly and the new T+1-period oligopoly with an added 
firm at the end, I consider sequential oligopoly n = (n1, … , nT , nT+1), where 
nT+1∈{0, 1}. With slight abuse of notation, I use X
∗
t
(Xt−1) to denote the cumu-
lative quantity after period t, conditional on cumulative quantity prior to period 
t being Xt−1 and X
∗
t









(0))… )). Note that the assumption states that the realized 
quantities are independent on nT+1.









course, when nT+1 = 0, we get that X















































































= 2P�(0)−P�(0) = P�(0).
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I prove the claim by induction. Fix a period t≤T and suppose that at each period s > t 
all players i∈s have X
i
c
= Xc. Moreover, suppose that the best-responses of the 
followers imply 
Note that these assumptions are satisfied for t = T, as (1) whenever a firm arrives at 
period T+1 by assumption it has the parameter Xc, and (2) Equation (19) is a spe-
cial case of Equation (20). For induction step, note that each firm i∈t we can use 





. The equilibrium behavior requires that 
In particular, on the equilibrium path, i.e., for X ∗
t−1









) are independent on nT+1. This is only true if  X
i
c
= Xc. This 
establishes the first induction assumption. Suppose now that X
i
c
= Xc for all i∈t. 
Then combining the optimality conditions we get 
Inserting this to Equation (20) gives 
This proves the second part of the induction assumption and therefore completes the 
proof. □
(20) X ∗(Xt) = X
∗(X ∗
T
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